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NOTES AND COMMENTS

means of professional improvement. Perhaps legislation in this
area will eventually be necessary if we are to attain such a goal.
In conclusion, the following statement of the district court judge
in Michaelson v. United States concerning the importance of this
deduction to the "little" taxpayer seems appropriate:
The importance of encouragement of individuals interested
in self-improvement should not be minimized. Certainly rapid
write-offs of investments in buildings, deductions for advertising and deductions for expenses in those higher brackets,
are no more important to them than a smaller deduction is to
one who has limited funds, as the taxpayer here."1
H.

ARTHUR SANDMAN

Conflict of Laws-Capacity to Sue-Which Law Should Govern?
It is generally accepted that the law of the place of wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury.1 In Shaw
v. Lee' this rule was applied to determine the capacity of one spouse
to sue the other. Plaintiff brought suit against her deceased husband's estate alleging that while riding through Virginia in an
automobile owned and operated by her husband, she was injured
in a collision between the automobile and a truck, and that the collision was caused by the joint and concurrent negligence of her husband and the truck driver. At the time of the injury plaintiff and
her husband were domiciled in North Carolina. The lower court
sustained defendant's demurrer to the complaint and on appeal the
supreme court affirmed. The court recognized that Virginia, unlike
North Carolina,' does not permit a married woman to sue her husband for injuries negligently inflicted.
Shaw v. Lee was not a case of first impression. It reaffirmed
North Carolina's previous position4 and is in accord with the mal1203 F. Supp. 830, 832-33 (E.D. Wash. 1961).
'Doss v. Sewell, 257 N.C. 404, 125 S.E.2d 899 (1962); Morse v. Walker,
229 N.C. 778, 51 S.E.2d 496 (1949); Wise v. Hollowell, 205 N.C. 286, 171
S.E. 82 (1933); 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378.2 (1935); RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-79 (1934); STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 182
(2d ed. 1951).
2258

N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963).

"'A husband and wife have a cause of action against each other to recover

damages sustained to their person or property as if they were unmarried.'

N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 52-10.1 (Supp. 1961).

'Howard v. Howard, 200 N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 101 (1931), is practically
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jority rule in this country--a rule which is a product of Beach's
vested rights theory.6 More recently, however, several cases have
established a trend-applauded by many writers in the field--away
from this mechanical application of a technical conflict of laws rule.
Instead they favor a conflicts rule which is shaped with regard to
the nature of the case at hand and gives more consideration to social,
economic, and domestic factors. This appears to be done best, in
order to stay within the existing framework for determining conflict rules, by a policy oriented method of characterization.' In
identical to the principal case, but there plaintiff sued her husband and not
his estate. Bogen v. Bogen, 219 N.C. 51, 12 S.E.2d 649 (1941), involved
the reverse situation. There the husband and wife were domiciled in Ohio,
where the common-law rule of family immunity was in force, and the accident occurred in North Carolina. The court refused to apply the law of the
family domicile and held the wife was entitled to maintain her action.
See Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 1248 (1952).
' Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights, 27 YALE
L. J. 656 (1918). See 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377.2-78.2 (1935).
The theoretic premise of vested rights is that when a case is decided
with multi-state contacts, a right is enforced which vested under the law
of the appropriate state. In the case of torts this is the place of the injury.
The purpose is to promote uniformity, and in turn discourage forum shopping. "Its greatest virtue is its simplicity, the facility of its application. It
reduces the legal mental process to a minimum because, once having determined that the matter is one of the substance, all that is left to do is to look
to the place where the harmful force first took injurious effect and then to
apply without distinction the substantive law there. Its universal adoption,
besides bringing about uniformity, would enable the lawyer in advising his
client to predict with facility and accuracy the judicial results in any situation, regardless of where suit might be brought." STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 201 (2d ed. 1951).
"Bingham, The Rise and Fall of Buckeye v. Buckeye, 1931-1959: Marital
Immunity for Torts in Conflict of Laws, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 237 (1962);
Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict
of Laws, 10 STAN. L. Rav. 205 (1958); Ford, Interspousal Liability for
Automobile Accidents in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason Versus the
Restatement, 15 U. PITT. L. REv. 397 (1954); Kelso, Automobile Accidents
and Indiana Conflict of Laws: Current Dilemmas, 33 IND. L. J. 297 (1958);
Packel, Backward and Forward in Conflicts, 31 TEMP. L. Q. 117 (1958).
See also STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 201-12 (2d ed. 1951), for a criticism
of the place of the tort rule.
s Some cases also refuse to follow the place of the tort rule because the
foreign law, if applied, would be contrary to the public policy of the forum.
Gooch v. Faucett, 122 N.C. 270, 29 S.E. 362 (1898). See generally RESTATEmExT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 5, comment b (1934).
In several cases the state of the forum and domicile has upheld the family
immunity rule when the accident occurred in a state where the immunity
had been abolished, on the ground that public policy of the forum forbade
one spouse from suing the other. Kircher v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669, 286
N.W. 120 (1939); Kyle v. Kyle, 210 Minn. 204, 297 N.W. 744 (1941);
Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936); Poling v. Poling, 116
W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935). These decisions may be responsible for
sbme obvious, forum shopping by spouses who in similar situations bring
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most instances the characterization determines the choice of law
rule which applies, so where the court characterizes an issue in a
tort action as "procedural" rather than "substantive" the law of the
forum applies and not the law of the place of wrong.' If an issue
is characterized as "contract" the law of the place of contracting may
determine questions concerning the formation of the contract, while
the law of the place of performance may determine questions relating to its performance;1" and if characterized as "family law" the
law of the domicile may be said to be the proper law to govern.'
Such a policy oriented method of characterization has been
applied by a few courts to problems involving family immunity,
capacity to sue, and other related issues. 2 The leading case among
their actions in the state where the accident occurred. To apply the place
of the tort rule under these circumstances, as North Carolina did in Bogen
v. Bogen, 219 N.C. 51, 12 S.E.2d 649 (1941), does not promote uniformity,
but rather encourages forum shopping.
ESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 585

(1934).

In Charnock v. Taylor, 223 N.C. 360, 26 S.E.2d 911 (1943), plaintiff sued
A for injuries arising out of an accident in Tennessee. A then sought to
join B for contribution as a joint tortfeasor under what is now N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-240 (1953). The common law was still in force in Tennessee
where there was no right of action by one joint tortfeasor to enforce contribution from another. The court characterized the right to join for contribution as substantive, and dismissed the action against B under Tennessee

law.

But see Ru"oRESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 311, 358 (1934).
STATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960),

which now says the validity of a contract is determined by the law of the
state with which the contract has its most significant relationship-which

might be the state chosen by the parties, the state of the contracting, or the
state where performance is to take place.
In Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 At.
163 (1928), a Connecticut statute provided that anyone renting a motor

vehicle to another should be liable for any damage caused to any person by
the operation of such vehicle while rented. The defendant rented A an automobile, and plaintiff was injured by A's negligent operation of the automobile in Massachusetts. The court characterized this as a contract action
rather than tort and applied the law of Connecticut, which was the place of
contracting.
" See 1 BEAL, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 110.1 (1935); RESTATEMENT, CONFLIT OF LAWS § 54 (1934).
2 Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955), applied the law
of the family domicile and not the place of the tort. The court characterized
the issue as one of capacity to sue and permitted the wife and her two unemancipated daughters to sue the husband and father for personal injuries
sustained in an automobile accident. Bruton v. Villoria, 138 Cal. App. 2d
642, 292 P.2d 638 (1956), refused to apply California law and impute the
husband's negligence to the wife. The wife sued defendant for injuries she
sustained in an automobile collision between defendant and her husband in

California. The court applied the law of plaintiff's domicile, where the
husband's negligence would not bar her recovery. Koplik v. C. P. Trucking
Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958), decided a wife could not sue her hus-
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these is Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co.,13 involving facts substantially similar to the principal case except that the issue of
capacity to sue was characterized as "family law." The plaintiff
sued her husband in Wisconsin, where they were domiciled, for
personal injuries sustained as a result of an automobile accident in
California, but unlike the principal case the Wisconsin Supreme
Court overruled its previous position 4 saying:
We are convinced that, from both the standpoint of public
policy and logic, the proper solution of the conflict-of-laws
problem, in cases similar to the instant action, is to hold that
the law of the domicile is the one that ought to be applied in
determining any issue of incapacity to sue based upon family
relationship. 5
The social function of both the law of torts and domestic relations would be best served if the court in the principal case, like
Haumschild, had characterized the issue as an incident of "family
law" to be governed by the law of the domicile.' 6 Why indeed are
problems of the law of torts ordinarily decided in accordance with
the law of the place of the wrong? If it is to carry out the social
purpose of the law, then what is the social purpose and function of
the law of torts?
The law of torts is the body of rules which indicates under what
circumstances one person who has suffered a loss can shift such loss
to another member of society.'1 While ordinarily a loss lies where
it falls, under special circumstances one can shift his loss to another,
as in the case where the other person "caused" the loss through conduct falling short of the standard set by the community. The comband in New Jersey where they were domiciled, even though the accident
occurred in New York where such suits are permitted.
See also Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953), where
the issue was the survival of a cause of action for personal injury after
defendant's death. In Arizona, where the injury occurred, it did not survive, but in California, the defendant's domicile, it did. The court characterized this as a problem of administration of estates and applied the survival law of the forum.
" 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
" Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931), was a leading
authority for the rule as applied by the principal case.
7 Wis. 2d at 137, 95 N.W.2d at 818 (1959).
Ford, supra note 7, at 417, points out that in the civil law countries interspousal actions sounding in tort are treated primarily as incidents of the
family law and governed by the law of the family domicile.
Rheinstein, Michigan Legal Studies: A Review, 41 MICH. L. REv. 83
(1942).
'

17
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munity which sets the standard should be the community where
the harm will be manifested. Such considerations are the foundation of the rule that problems of tort law should be governed by the
law of the place of the wrong. These same considerations should
also determine the scope of the rule's application.
Therefore, in determining whether the rule should apply to such
a problem as that of allowing a law suit between members of a
family, it should be asked whether this is primarily a problem of
shifting loss or one of regulating the relations between the members
of a family. Since the two reasons most often advanced for the
common law rule of family immunity are the ancient concept the
husband and wife constitute in law but one person, and that to
permit such suits will create family discord and disrupt family
harmony,"8 it would appear that for problems of this kind the most
appropriate law is that of the family domicile. 9
In light of these considerations this writer suggests that North
Carolina amend G.S. § 5Z-10.1 to provide that a husband and wife
domiciled in North Carolina have a cause of action against each other
to recover for injuries, wherever sustained, as if they were unmarried.
SAMUEL S. WOODLEY, JR.

Constitutional Law-Case or Controversy-Dismissal for Mootness
Where a decision in a case at bar will have no effect because of
some intervening fact which has rendered the case moot, the United
" Ford, supra note 7, at 398, sets out the historical background and reasons for disallowing suits between spouses.
Johnson v. People's First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 Pa. 116, 145 A.2d
716 (1958), held that the doctrine of intrafamily immunity from suit by a
member of the family expires upon the death of the person protected and does
not extend to a decedent's estate for the reason that death terminates the
family relationship and there is no longer a relationship in which the state
or public policy has an interest.
10 The court in the principal case also dismissed plaintiff's
plea for recovery under North Carolina's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act
of 1957 by pointing out that liability insurance protects against claims
legally asserted, but does not itself produce liability. Plaintiff, however, did
not contend that the presence of liability insurance should create liability,
but rather contended with some merit that by allowing defendant immunity,
the public policy of the state, as expressed by the vehicle responsibility act,
for protecting its citizens who are injured in automobile accidents would be
contravened. In North Carolina a wife who is injured by her husband's
negligent operation of an automobile will have the protection of the insurance
required under this act, but by denying plaintiff the same protection, because
she happened to incur her injury across the state line, the insurance company
is given a fortuitous windfall.

